1. That GGC estimates may be severely biased or of high variance, and 2. That GGC fails to reveal the full structural/causal mechanisms of a system.
Unfortunately, these claims rest, respectively, on an incomplete evaluation of the literature and a misconception about what GGC can be said to measure. Stokes and Purdon explain how bias and variance in GGC estimation arise from the use of separate, independent full and reduced regressions. However, this problem has long been recognised (2, 3) and, moreover, has already been solved by methods which derive GGC from a single full regression. These methods essentially extract reduced model parameters from the full model via factorisation of the spectral density matrix. Well-documented approaches include Wilson's frequency-domain algorithm (4), Whittle's time-domain algorithm (3), and a state-space approach which devolves to solution of a discrete-time algebraic Riccati equation (5, 6) . Thus, the source of bias and variance discussed in (1) has already been resolved 1 . We note * l.c.barnett@sussex.ac.uk (corresponding author) † abb22@sussex.ac.uk ‡ a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk 1 There will still be bias due to nonnegativity of the GGC sample statistic, which may be countered by standard surrogate data methods.
that (1) erroneously state that "Barnett and Seth [. . . ] have proposed fitting the reduced model and using it to directly compute the spectral components . . . " whereas, as mentioned, we derive GGC from a single full regression (3).
Stokes and Purdon then note that GGC reflects a combination of 'transmitter' and 'channel' dynamics, and is independent of 'receiver' dynamics. Again, this independence has been previously identified, as a direct consequence of the invariance of GGC under certain affine transformations (7) . But why should this independence matter? They suggest that it runs "counter to intuitive notions of causality intended to explain observed effects" since, according to them, "neuroscientists seek to determine the mechanisms that produce 'effects' within a neural system or circuit as a function of inputs or 'causes' observed at other locations". In fact, this view resonates more strongly with approaches such as dynamic causal modelling (DCM)-usually characterised as 'effective connectivity' -which attempt to find the optimal mechanistic (circuit level) description that explains observed data. GGC, on the other hand, models dependencies among observed responses and is therefore an example of (directed) 'functional connectivity' (see (8) for a comparison). Essentially, the distinction is between making inferences about an underlying physical causal mechanism (DCM) and making inferences about directed information flow (GGC; 9). Both address valid questions.
Our view is that the real problems associated with GGC analysis of neurophysiological data reside elsewhere: with issues of stationarity, linearity and exogenous influences, as noted in (1), but also with the noise, sampling rates and temporal/spatial aggregation engendered by neural data acquisition (6, 10) .
